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ABSTRACT:  Drawing on data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), David 
Neumark (2002) finds that living wage laws have brought substantial wage increases for a high 
proportion of workers in cities that have passed these laws.  He also finds that living wage laws 
significantly reduce employment opportunities for low-wage workers.  We argue, first, that by 
truncating his sample to concentrate his analysis on low-wage workers, Neumark’s analysis is 
vulnerable to sample selection bias, and that his results are not robust to alternative specifications 
that utilize quantile regression to avoid such selection bias.  In addition, we argue that Neumark 
has erroneously utilized the CPS data set to derive these results.  We show that, with respect to 
both wage and employment effects, Neumark’s results are not robust to more accurate alternative 
classifications as to which workers are covered by living wage laws.  We also show that the wage 
effects that Neumark observes for all U.S. cities with living wage laws can be more accurately 
explained as resulting from effects on sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles alone of a 
falling unemployment rate and rising minimum wage in that city.     
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Non-Technical Summary of Working Paper 
Since 1994 over eighty municipal governments in the United States have adopted so-
called “living wage” ordinances.  Most of the existing research has recognized the benefits of 
these laws for those workers who receive living wage increases and for their families  But this 
research has also been clear in acknowledging the limitations of these measures in terms of 
affecting large numbers of the working poor.   
 
David Neumark’s recent study finds that the effects of living wage laws are much broader 
than this previous research has suggested.  Building upon data provided in the monthly Current 
Population Survey (CPS), Neumark concludes that wages for as much as 11% of the low wage 
workforce may rise as a result of these measures in cities that adopt them, an estimate that is 
orders of magnitude beyond previous findings.  Neumark also concludes that living wage laws 
reduce employment for the lowest wage workers in such cities by a significant degree.  In short, 
Neumark finds that living wage laws pose a clear trade-off between higher wages versus fewer 
jobs.   
 
This paper assesses the robustness of the Neumark’s findings, focusing primarily, as he 
himself does, on the effects on wages.  We also consider his findings with respect to employment.  
We find that Neumark’s findings are neither methodologically sound nor robust either statistically 
or substantively.  To begin with, Neumark’s analysis relies on a statistical technique that is well-
known to produce unreliable results.  We briefly discuss the professional literature on this subject, 
then show that Neumark’s results are invalidated when we use an alternative statistical technique 
that controls for the problems faced by Neumark’s methodology.   
 
We then proceed by accepting Neumark’s statistical approach on its own terms, and 
within that context, raise other concerns with his analysis.  Most broadly, we argue that the CPS 
cannot be effectively utilized in the manner deployed by Neumark, to detect the effects of living 
wage laws.  In attempting to work with the CPS for this purpose, Neumark broadly classifies 
workers as among those “potentially covered” by living wage ordinances—i.e. those receiving 
legally mandated raises because of the implementation of living wage laws—without providing 
evidence as to whether his system of assigning “potential coverage” is consistent with the actual 
experiences of cities in implementing their ordinances.  His decisions in selecting which workers 
should be included among those “potentially covered” to receive mandated raises several serious 
questions.   
 
For example, Neumark includes workers who receive wages below the national or 
relevant state-wide minimum wage—sub-minimum wage workers—as among those who have 
“potentially” received mandated living wage increases even though these workers are being paid 
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below the lower mandated minimum wage standard.  Neumark also assumes that virtually all 
workers are “potentially covered” by living wage laws in cities where those laws apply to firms 
receiving subsidies or other forms of business assistance from local governments.  However, 
officials in nearly all the relevant cities report that they have not yet applied the living wage 
mandates to any businesses in their cities simply on the basis of their receiving subsidies or other 
forms of assistance from government.   In addition, while Neumark’s data set is nominally 
constructed to include a wide range of cities that have passed living wage ordinances, in fact most 
of the observations from cities with living wage ordinances come from a small number of 
municipalities.  Indeed, in a majority of Neumark’s econometric models, over half of all relevant 
observations from living wage cities come from Los Angeles alone. 
 
In our statistical models relying on Neumark’s own technique, we show that Neumark’s 
findings are invalidated when 1) workers in living wage cities are reclassified from Neumark’s 
“potentially covered” category to uncovered based on the actual extent of coverage in these cities; 
or 2) sub-minimum wage workers are reclassified from Neumark’s “potentially covered” 
category to being uncovered by living wage laws.  Consistent with the high concentration of 
observations coming from Los Angeles alone, we also find that 3) Neumark’s statistically 
significant results on wage effects are invalidated when we reclassify sub-minimum wage 
workers in Los Angeles alone as being uncovered rather than “potentially covered.”  In other 
words, Neumark’s results on wage effects throughout all U.S. cities in his sample hinge on his 
having included sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles as covered by that city’s living 
wage laws.  We also find that, in fact, the rise in wages for sub-minimum wage workers in Los 
Angeles over the time period investigated by Neumark is being driven to a significant extent by a 
sharply declining unemployment rate in the city and a rise in the California minimum wage, not 
by the city’s living wage ordinance. 
 
Our overall conclusion is that David Neumark’s analysis of the effects of living wage 
laws in the United States has produced no results that stand up to the scrutiny of this critical 
replication exercise.  Of course, our results to not speak to the broader substantive question as to 
how living wage laws have affected low-wage workers in terms of either their wages or their 
employment opportunities.  But we expect that many researchers will continue to make progress 
in addressing these substantive questions, which are, of course, the central matters of concern for 
understanding how living wage laws are affecting the lives of low-wage workers in the United 
States. 
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1. Introduction and Summary of Findings 
Since 1994 over eighty municipal governments in the United States have adopted so-
called “living wage” ordinances.  While the specifics of these various measures differ, their 
common theme is that they require firms doing business with local governments to pay minimum 
wage rates that are well above both the U.S. and state-level minimum wage levels.  The aim of 
these laws is to set a wage floor high enough so that a full-time worker can support a family of 
three or four at a living standard above the official poverty line.  Most of the laws apply to large-
scale city service contractors, although a limited number also apply to firms receiving financial 
assistance, tax abatements or other subsidies.   
Most of the existing research has recognized the benefits of these laws for those workers 
who receive living wage increases and for their families (see for example Pollin and Luce 2000, 
Pollin and Brenner 2000, and Reich, Hall and Hsu 1999).  But this research has also been clear in 
acknowledging the limitations of these measures in terms of affecting large numbers of the 
working poor.  Indeed, most studies of both proposed and enacted living wage ordinances find 
that these measures affect a very small number of private sector firms in a given locale, and that 
the benefits of higher wages are concentrated among a small fraction of the overall workforce 
within any given municipality (e.g. Pollin and Luce, op cit.; Niedt et al. 1999; Nissen 1998).   
Recent work by David Neumark (2002) finds that the effects of living wage laws are 
much broader than this previous research has suggested.  Building upon data provided in the 
monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), Neumark concludes that wages for as much as 11% of 
the low wage workforce may rise as a result of these measures in cities that adopt them, an 
estimate that is orders of magnitude beyond previous findings.  Neumark also concludes that 
living wage laws reduce employment for the lowest wage workers in such cities, with an 
estimated employment elasticity of -.14.  In short, Neumark finds that living wage laws pose a 
clear trade-off between higher wages versus fewer jobs.  But because Neumark also finds that the 
positive wage benefits for low-wage workers have been stronger than the costs in terms of job 
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losses, the overall effect of these ordinances according to Neumark has been to reduce poverty in 
cities that have adopted them.   
Because of the importance of these questions to an accurate understanding of the 
dynamics of living wage ordinances, this paper will assess the robustness of the Neumark’s recent 
findings, focusing primarily, as he himself does, on the effects on wages.  We also consider his 
findings with respect to employment.  We do not examine his analysis of poverty impacts, since 
the viability of this analysis will hinge entirely on the prior analysis of wage and employment 
effects.   
Our overall conclusion is that Neumark’s findings are neither methodologically sound nor 
robust either statistically or substantively.  To begin with, Neumark’s econometric model relies 
on a truncated sample of workers that excludes higher-wage workers from the data pool.  While 
Neumark’s approach is correct in focusing its attention on low-wage workers, the particular 
manner in which he does so, through truncating the full sample, is vulnerable to sample selection 
bias.  This diminishes the reliability of his results, since they are subject to both bias and 
inconsistency.  We show that Neumark’s results are not robust when one takes an alternative 
approach to truncation, that is, utilizing quantile regression.   
But we then also accept Neumark’s truncation approach on its own terms, and within that 
context, raise other concerns with his analysis.  Most broadly, we argue that the CPS cannot be 
effectively utilized in the manner deployed by Neumark, to detect the effects of living wage laws.  
In attempting to work with the CPS for this purpose, Neumark broadly classifies workers as 
among those “potentially covered” by living wage ordinances—i.e. those receiving legally 
mandated raises because of the implementation of living wage laws—without providing evidence 
as to whether his system of assigning “potential coverage” is consistent with the actual 
experiences of cities in implementing their ordinances.  His decisions in selecting which workers 
should be included among those “potentially covered” to receive mandated raises several serious 
questions.   
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For example, Neumark includes workers who receive wages below the national or relevant 
state-wide minimum wage—sub-minimum wage workers—as among those “potentially covered” 
by living wage laws, despite the fact that these workers aren’t being paid at the lower minimum 
wage standard.  Neumark also assumes that virtually all workers are “potentially covered” by 
living wage laws in cities where those laws apply to firms receiving subsidies or other forms of 
business assistance from local governments.  However, officials in nearly all the relevant cities 
report that they have not yet applied the living wage mandates to any businesses in their cities 
simply on the basis of their receiving subsidies or other forms of assistance from government.   In 
addition, while Neumark’s data set is nominally constructed to include a wide range of cities that 
have passed living wage ordinances, in fact most of the observations from cities with living wage 
ordinances come from a small number of municipalities.  Indeed, in a majority of Neumark’s 
econometric models, over half of all relevant observations from living wage cities come from Los 
Angeles alone. 
Even in the models in which we accept Neumark’s sample truncation technique on its 
own terms, we still show that all of Neumark’s statistically significant findings are invalidated 
when 1) workers in living wage cities are reclassified from Neumark’s “potentially covered” 
category to uncovered based on the actual extent of coverage in these cities; or 2) sub-minimum 
wage workers are reclassified from Neumark’s “potentially covered” category to being uncovered 
by living wage laws.  Consistent with the high concentration of observations coming from Los 
Angeles alone, we also find that 3) Neumark’s statistically significant results on wage effects are 
invalidated when we reclassify sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles alone as being 
uncovered rather than “potentially covered.”  In other words, Neumark’s results on wage effects 
throughout all U.S. cities in his sample hinge on his having included sub-minimum wage workers 
in Los Angeles as covered by that city’s living wage laws.  We also find that, in fact, the rise in 
wages for sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles over the time period investigated by 
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Neumark is being driven to a significant extent by a sharply declining unemployment rate in the 
city and a rise in the California minimum wage, not by the city’s living wage ordinance. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows:  In Section 2, we present an explanation and 
replication of Neumark’s basic findings for wages and employment.  In Section 3 we discuss 
methodological shortcomings with the Neumark’s analysis.  In Sections 4 and 5, we re-estimate 
his findings for wage effects and employment effects of living wage laws on the basis of both and 
alternative econometric methods and alternative choices as to which workers should be classified 
as likely to have received mandated living wage increases.  Section 6 concludes.   
2. The Neumark Model – Explanation and Replication 
In his 2002 Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) Report “How Living Wage Laws 
Affect Low Wage Workers and Low-Income Families,” Neumark uses data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to measure the effect of living wages on the wages and employment 
status of low wage workers during the 1996-2000 period.  Specifically, Neumark constructs a 
pooled cross section of observations from the CPS, utilizing all persons in cities with at least 25 
observations in a given month of the calendar year.1   Taking a difference-in-difference approach, 
he then attempts to gauge living wage effects by analyzing low wage workers in large cities with 
and without living wage laws over the period in question.  We will first describe his methods for 
assessing the effect of living wage laws on the earnings of low-wage workers and then turn to his 
employment analysis. Our remarks will focus on the three models from which he derives his basic 
findings. 
                                                 
1 In the wage analysis, the sample is constructed from observations of employed persons earning an hourly 
wage greater than $1.00 and less than or equal to $100. In both the wage and employment analysis, 
observations are restricted to individuals between the ages of 16 and 70, inclusive.  
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Wage Analysis 
Equation 1 presents the first model that Neumark employs to assess the effect of living 
wage laws on low-wage workers’ earnings: 
(1)   ln(wicmy) = α + Xicmyω + βln(wmincmy) + γmax[ln(wlivcmy),ln(wmincmy)] +  
                   δyYy + δMMm + δCCc + εicmy 
Here Neumark estimates a wage equation where w is the hourly wage, X is a vector of dummy 
variables controlling for gender, race, education, and marital status, wmin is the higher of the 
federal and state minimum wage, and wliv is the higher of the prevailing minimum wage or 
applicable municipal living wage (our notation throughout mirrors that in Neumark’s study).  Y, 
M, and C are vectors of dummy variables controlling for each year, month, and city respectively.  
The unit of analysis (denoted by the subscript of icmy) is the individual worker, within a given 
city c, month m, and year y.  Note that β captures the effect of the minimum wage (state or 
federal) on individual worker wages, and γ captures the wage effect of the living wage on 
workers’ wages.  
Neumark employs a second model that attempts to discriminate between the wage effect 
of living wage ordinances experienced by “covered” workers versus those experienced by 
“uncovered” workers.  In classifying workers as covered or uncovered, Neumark distinguishes 
between two types of living wage ordinances.  The first type of law applies only to those firms 
that perform services under contract with a municipality.  These usually include such services as 
landscape maintenance or security guard and janitorial services.  For these “contractor-only” 
ordinances, covered workers are defined to be those individuals working in service industries 
(usually about 10-20% of the workforce). 
The second type of living wage ordinance he identifies applies to any firm that receives a 
designated form of financial assistance (such as utility subsidies, tax abatements, or industrial 
revenue bond guarantees, etc.) from a municipality.  For ordinances with such  “business-
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assistance” provisions, covered workers are defined to be all private sector workers (usually about 
90-95% of the workforce), since any business in the private sector could potentially receive 
financial assistance from its local government.  It is important to emphasize that, unlike most 
other researchers on this issue, Neumark makes no attempt to determine which firms and workers 
are actually likely to be covered according to the stipulations of the living wage ordinances in any 
given municipality.  He rather relies on broad assumptions as to which workers are “potentially” 
covered, then proceeds with his estimation exercises through including all “potentially” covered 
workers in his data sample.  As we will see, Neumark’s assumptions as to who should be 
included in the pool of potentially covered workers are crucial to his overall findings. 
Equation 2 presents the second model used by Neumark:  
(2)  ln(wicmy) = α + Xicmyω + βln(wmincmy) + γmax[ln(wlivcmy) x Covicmy,ln(wmincmy)] + 
γ’max[ln(wlivcmy) x Uncovicmy,ln(wmincmy)] +  δyYy + δMMm + δCCc + εicmy 
Here Cov is a dummy variable equal to one for covered workers and Uncov is a dummy variable 
equal to one for workers who are not covered.  Note that while β still controls for the wage effect 
of the minimum wage, γ and γ’ capture the separate wage effects of the living wage for covered 
and uncovered workers, respectively.2  
In his third model, Neumark returns to the specification in equation 1, but also attempts 
to distinguish between the effects of contractor-only versus business-assistance living wage laws.  
Equation 3 depicts this approach:  
(3)  ln(wicmy) = α + Xicmyω + βln(wmincmy) + γmax[ln(wlivcmy) x Busicmy,ln(wmincmy)] + 
γ’max[ln(wlivcmy) x Conicmy,ln(wmincmy)] + δyYy + δMMm + δCCc + εicmy  
Here Bus is a dummy variable equal to one for workers living in a city with a living wage 
ordinance that includes a business assistance provision and Con is a dummy variable equal to one 
for workers living in a city with a contractor-only living wage ordinance.  Again, β controls for 
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the effect of the minimum wage on individual wage levels, and γ and γ’ capture the different 
wage effects of business-assistance type living wage ordinances and contractor-only type living 
wage ordinances respectively.  
Neumark estimates these three models using data on two different subsets of the 
workforce: 1) workers who fall into the lowest wage decile in a given month of the sample in 
their respective city, and 2) workers whose wages place them in the lowest quartile of the wage 
distribution, but not in the lowest decile, i.e. those between the 10th and 25th wage centile in the 
sample month in their respective city.3  With each model Neumark also employs three slightly 
different specifications. The first uses a contemporaneous living wage variable. The second uses a 
living wage variable that is lagged 6 months. The third uses a living wage variable that is lagged 
12 months. We replicate Neumark’s basic results in Table 1A (these figures are identical to those 
found in Tables 5.3-5.5 of Neumark, 2002, p. 52, 63, and 65, respectively).  Neumark also 
presents estimates using data from higher centile ranges.  However, almost all of his significant 
results are limited to the lowest decile.  He therefore focuses most of his attention on the model 
specifications and results presented here. 
[INSERT TABLE 1A HERE]  
The results which are of primary interest and which are statistically significant in all three 
models are those using the 12 month lagged living wage variables.  For example, Neumark’s 
regression estimates of Model 1 indicate that with a one-year lag, those workers in the lowest 
wage decile in a living wage city have a wage elasticity of 0.07.  That is, given a 100% increase 
in the living wage one year earlier, workers within the lowest wage decile in a living wage city 
experience a 7% increase, on average, in their wages.  Neumark offers two possible 
interpretations of this result and similar results in subsequent specifications.  The first possible 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Neumark adds a set of dummy variables to the vector X of Model 2 to control for level differences 
between the different worker subgroups that are covered by the various living wage ordinances. 
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interpretation Neumark offers is that, given that the maximum wage elasticity we would expect 
for a covered worker would be 1, the .07 elasticity represents the proportion of workers in the 
lowest decile that receive the full living wage raise—that is, seven percent of all workers in this 
lowest decile are receiving the living wage increase.   The second possible interpretation is that 
workers earning the living wage increase now earn wages that place them in a higher wage decile.  
This “bumping up” effect would then mean that the mean wage for the lowest decile would rise, 
since the decile would now include workers whose wages had previously placed them in the next 
higher decile.  As Neumark notes, this second interpretation of his results can also incorporate 
disemployment effects.  That is, if some workers in the lowest decile become nonemployed due 
to the living wage and therefore drop out of the pool of wage earners, that would mean that the 
newly constituted lowest decile would now include workers earning higher wages.   In our 
analysis of Neumark’s findings, we find that his first explanation cannot be supported by the 
relevant evidence, but that his second explanation is empirically possible.  However, it is another 
matter whether this second interpretation is consistent with the full range of relevant evidence. 
In Model 2, with a one-year lag, those workers living in a living wage city and 
categorized as “covered” have a wage elasticity of 0.11. Those who live in a city that has a living 
wage ordinance that was enacted one year previously and are categorized as “uncovered” are 
statistically indistinguishable from those workers who live in cities that did not have living wage 
ordinances enacted in the prior year.  Finally, in Model 3, with a one-year lag, those workers 
living in a city that has a living wage ordinance that includes a business assistance provision have 
a wage elasticity of 0.11.  Those workers living in a city that had a living wage ordinance one 
year prior that targets contractors only are indistinguishable statistically from those workers who 
live in cities that did not have any type of living wage ordinance enacted one year before.  Thus 
Neumark concludes that only those workers in cities where living wage laws have business-
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Neumark also presents estimates using data from higher centile ranges but because virtually all of his 
significant results are limited to the lowest decile, he focuses most of his attention on the two subsets 
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assistance clauses appear to have a statistically significant wage effect.  Our regression estimates 
yield identical results, namely wage elasticity estimates of 0.07, 0.11, 0.11 in Models 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. 
Note that Neumark also finds a statistically significant effect for the living wage variable 
lagged six months for covered workers in Model 2 and for business assistance cities in Model 3.  
In both cases the magnitude of the living wage coefficient is approximately half that of the 
coefficient for the living wage variable lagged 12 months.  Although Neumark does not highlight 
the statistically significant results for the six month lagged specification, in all subsequent 
analysis we examine this specification as well as the twelve month lag. 
In Table 1B we include a model specification that is not presented in Neumark’s original 
work, but which draws directly from it, that is:   
(4)  ln(wicmy) = α + Xicmyω + βln(wmincmy) + γmax[ln(wlivcmy) x Busicmyx Covicmy, 
ln(wmincmy)] + γ’max[ln(wlivcmy) x ConicmyxCovicmy, ln(wmincmy)] + θmax[ln(wlivcmy) 
x Busicmyx Uncovicmy, ln(wmincmy)] + θ’max[ln(wlivcmy) x ConicmyxUncovicmy, 
ln(wmincmy)]+δyYy + δMMm + δCC
                                                                                                                                                
c + εicmy  
What we call Model 4 combines the covered/uncovered distinction of Neumark’s Model 2, with 
the contractor-only/business assistance distinction drawn in his Model 3.  In this instance positive 
and statistically significant coefficients on  γ ( γ’) would indicate that covered workers in business 
assistance (or contractor-only) cities were receiving wage increases as a result of the respective 
living wage laws.  By contrast if θ (θ’) displays a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
this instead means that uncovered workers in living wage cities are experiencing wage increases.  
As can be seen from Table 1B, which presents results for the lowest decile and both the 6 and 12-
month lagged specification, results from our Model 4 appear to confirm Neumark’s findings that 
it is covered workers in business assistance cities who are receiving wage increases as a result of 
 
described in the text.  
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the passage of living wage laws.  Specifically we estimate a wage elasticity of .11 for the 12 
month lagged specification and .07 for the six month lagged specification. 
[INSERT TABLE 1B HERE] 
Employment Analysis 
 The framework Neumark employs for analyzing the effect of living wage laws on 
employment mirrors his wage analysis discussed above.  Specifically Neumark utilizes a linear 
probability model to assess the effect that living laws have on the employment status of 
individuals throughout the wage distribution.  One significant difference between the wage and 
employment models, however, is that the employment model incorporates individuals currently 
outside the labor force into the analysis.  As such, Neumark is required to impute wages for non-
working individuals, in order to place them within the overall wage distribution.  For consistency, 
Neumark then calculates imputed wages for all workers, including those holding jobs, and utilizes 
these imputed wage rates, rather than actual wages for the employed workers, in establishing 
decile thresholds.   
 We reproduce Neumark’s initial employment results in Table 2A (these figures are 
identical to those found in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 of Neumark, 2002, p. 82-3).  Consistent with 
Neumark’s original results, for Model 1 we find a negative statistically significant effect of living 
wage laws, lagged 12 months, on employment status for those individuals in the lowest wage 
decile.  The estimated coefficient is –5.62.  Given that the average employment rate for the lowest 
decile is approximately .4, this implies an elasticity of -.14 (i.e -.056/.4).  In other words, these 
results suggest that for a 100 percent increase in wages generated through the living wage 
mandate, the employment rate for the lowest decile of workers would decline by 14 percent. 
 But note with Neumark’s Model 1 results the additional statistically significant findings.  
That is, in four specifications with data from the 25th-50 and 50th-75th centile ranges, Neumark 
finds that the living wage laws exert a statistically significant positive influence on the 
employment rate.  These results would appear anomalous—that the living wage laws would, first 
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exert any significant influence on employment for highly-paid workers; and second, that any such 
employment effect due to rising wages would be positive rather than negative.  Neumark provides 
a one-sentence aside on these findings, offering the possibility that the living wage increase is 
responsible for producing proportionally more high-end jobs.  But he offers no evidence to 
corroborate this hunch.   
 Considering now Neumark’s Model 3, we also find a statistically significant effect for the 
living wage 12 months lagged within the lowest wage decile in business assistance cities, with an 
estimated coefficient of –5.88, implying an elasticity of -.15.    
[INSERT TABLE 2A HERE] 
One advantage that arises when modeling employment status as opposed to wages is that 
using working and nonworking individuals dramatically increases the number of cities for which 
Neumark’s inclusion criteria of 25 observations in a given city-month cell are met.  In all, 
Neumark uses a total of 223 cities in his employment analysis, as compared with the 130 cities 
that he is able to use in his wage analysis.  A natural question that arises, however, when 
juxtaposing results from the wage and employment analysis, is whether the statistical significance 
of Neumark’s employment results would remain if the analysis were conducted on the same set of 
cities used for his wage analysis.  This question is especially germane in light of the fact that 
Neumark himself notes that “[t]he evidence on employment effects is weaker than the evidence 
on wage effects,” (ibid, p. 86).  As seen in Table 2B, Neumark’s findings appear to hold for the 
restricted set of cities.  For Model 1 we find a statistically significant effect for the 12 month lag 
of living wage laws in the lowest wage decile, with an estimated coefficient of –4.8.  For Model 3 
we also find a statistically significant effect in business assistance cities, with an estimated 
coefficient of –5.34 for the living wage lagged 12 months.  In both cases the coefficients (and 
implied elasticities) are smaller than those estimated using the larger set of cities.  The statistical 
significance is also weaker in the Model 3 specification.   
[TABLE 2B BELONGS HERE] 
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3. Assessing the Neumark Approach 
In this section we discuss several potential limitations to Neumark’s methodological 
approach and examine several potentially problematic features of the features of his data sample. 
Sample Truncation and Selection Bias 
 Neumark’s focuses his analysis of living wage laws on workers at the lower portions of 
the wage distribution.  Indeed, as we have seen, he obtains statistically significant effects of living 
wage laws only when he narrows his data set to include workers in the lowest decile of the overall 
wage distribution.  The methodology Neumark employs here is known as a truncation of the full 
data set. 
 Given that the living wage laws are of course targeted at benefiting low-wage workers, 
not all workers, it is appropriate that Neumark’s analysis be focused on the lowest-paid workers 
only.  However, as has been demonstrated in the literature, Neumark’s method of truncation is 
vulnerable to selection bias, since he is truncating the full sample based on workers’ wages, the 
dependent variable in the model.  This approach to truncation can produce both biased and 
inconsistent estimates of model coefficients (see Maddala 1983).  The recent survey article by 
Koenker and Hallock (2001) provides several practical illustrations where the type of truncation 
employed by Neumark can create a seriously distorted statistical picture.4 
 As Koenker and Hallock make clear, a more appropriate econometric technique with 
which one can focus attention on the lower wage distribution while avoiding the selection bias 
associated with truncated regression is quantile regression.  This is because with a quantile 
regression, one can choose the central tendency point around which to estimate a regression—for 
example, wages at the 10th decile rather than the mean—without truncating the sample to exclude 
the upper 90 percent of workers from the analysis.  Koenker and Hallock provide numerous 
                                                 
4 One of the examples Koenker and Hallock describe is Engel’s classic analysis of the relationship between 
food expenditure and household income.  In this case, they show how a truncation on the dependent 
variable such as Neumark performed “would yield disastrous results.”  They further comment that “such 
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examples in which the quantile regression technique has been used in recent years in labor 
econometric models.  In the next section of the paper, we perform a quantile regression on 
Neumark’s data sample. 
Sample Size Issues 
Unlike analysis at the national level, utilizing the Current Population Survey to study 
local area labor markets can frequently be difficult, due to relatively small sample sizes.  This is 
particularly true if the analysis is concentrated on a subset of the local-area labor market (in our 
discussion we take the local area labor market to be the Metropolitan Statistical Area – MSA).  
Although Neumark utilizes data from a broad range of cities, the analysis fundamentally is one of 
local area labor markets, since it is within the MSA that the difference-in-difference methodology 
applies. 
This general problem of small sample sizes for local areas is exacerbated by the specific 
task of detecting the effects of living wage laws in which, according to previous researchers, the 
number of workers affected by the laws will be a very small proportion of the total low-wage 
labor force.  Take for example the case of Los Angeles.  In 1999 there were approximately 4.6 
million people in the Los Angeles labor market (i.e. the Los Angeles-Long Beach Primary MSA).  
Pollin and Luce (2000) had estimated that, as of 1999, the LA living wage ordinance would cover 
no more than 7,600 employees, that is, no more than 1 in 600 workers in the local LA labor 
market.  Given that in 1999 the CPS sampled approximately 5000 wage earners in the Los 
Angeles-Long Beach PMSA, this implies that there are likely to be about eight workers covered 
by the living law within this sample5.  This number is too small a number to obtain statistically 
reliable estimates.   
                                                                                                                                                 
strategies are doomed to failure for all the reasons so carefully laid out in Heckman’s (1979) work on 
sample selection.” 
5 The estimate of eight covered workers in the CPS sample is derived as follows:  7,600 is 0.17 percent of 
the full 4.6 million workforce in Los Angeles.  The CPS sample is approximately 5,000 workers, and 0.17 
percent of 5,000 is approximately eight. 
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The crucial question to ask here therefore is:  what is the probability that a large enough 
number of workers receiving a living wage would be included in the CPS sample?  Assume we  
set 25 as the minimum number of workers receiving living wage increases necessary to conduct 
meaningful statistical analysis.  If it is in fact the case that about 7,600 workers are covered by the 
law, then the odds that 25 or more will be included in the CPS sample of 5,000 are approximately 
one in 500,000.  If we assume 30 to be the minimum necessary number for the CPS sample, then 
the odds of including that number or more in the CPS sample rise to one in 244 million.6 
The problem is complicated further by the fact that even if directly affected workers were 
in the sample, there is no way within the CPS data of identifying who they are.  Such a 
determination would require information about individuals’ primary employers, as well as 
information from the city as to which private sector firms were covered by their living wage law.  
Because of these data limitations, Neumark adopts the method described above for identifying 
“potentially” covered workers.  Thus, to take the Los Angeles example once again, under 
Neumark’s definition, 97 percent of the Los Angeles low-wage labor market is “potentially” 
covered by the LA living wage ordinance, which translates into approximately 450,000 workers 
within the lowest wage decile in Los Angeles being in the “potentially covered” category.  
Figures of this magnitude are far beyond what any previous observer had suggested was even a 
most high-end estimate of the coverage range for living wage laws.  
                                                 
6 The exact formula for determining the probability of 25 or more workers covered by the LA living wage 
ordinance appearing in the Current Population Survey is: 
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In this calculation, 5000 is the approximate sample size drawn from the Los Angeles-Long Beach PMSA 
while k is the number of covered workers in the CPS and p is the probability that a given individual will be 
a covered worker.  Based on the fact that there were approximately 4.6 million labor force participants in 
the Los Angeles-Long Beach PMSA in 1999, and approximately 7,600 covered workers at that time, 
p=7,600/4,600,000. 
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It is important to note, moreover, that Neumark is not referring with this category of 
“potentially covered” workers to those who may be receiving non-mandated “ripple effect” wage 
increases—i.e. those workers whose employers give them raises after a living wage law passes 
even though the living wage law does not mandate that this be done.  It is certainly true that living 
wage laws, like minimum wage laws, do generate some ripple wage increases for noncovered 
workers.  But none of the existing literature on this topic suggests that such ripple effects are 
orders of magnitude larger in terms of number of workers getting raises than the mandated wage 
increases, nor does Neumark introduce any arguments or evidence to support such a position.7 
Indeed, Neumark never claims that his category of “potentially covered” workers includes 
workers receiving non-mandated ripple effect raises.  He is clear, rather, that his category of  
“potentially covered” workers includes all workers employed in industries where businesses 
could potentially be mandated to provide living wage increases (see Neumark 2002, pp. 58 – 61). 
Living Wage Effects on Sub-Minimum Wage Workers 
Our next major concern is Neumark inclusion of sub-minimum wage workers in his data 
pool without having provided a careful explanation as to why it is reasonable to do so.  Sub-
minimum wage workers could possibly benefit through a ripple effect from a mandated living 
wage increase.  But because, by definition, they are not receiving mandated minimum wage 
increases, it is difficult to see how they would qualify as among those “potentially covered” to 
receive mandated living wage increases.  Neumark’s decision to include sub-minimum wage 
workers as among those potentially covered is especially important given that it is only in the 
lowest decile of the wage distribution that Neumark finds statistically significant effects from 
living wage laws.  Yet, as Neumark reports in Table 1.4 of his study, the upper bound for the 10th 
decile in many cities is frequently at or only slightly above the relevant minimum wage (Neumark 
                                                 
7 See Pollin and Brenner (2000), pp. 49–55 for one effort at utilizing the existing literature on minimum 
wage ripple effects to projecting its potential magnitude for the case of the living wage ordinance in Santa 
Monica, CA.   Some of the more recent literature on minimum wage ripple effects includes Katz and 
Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1995). 
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2002, p. 7).  In fact, we estimate that over a quarter of workers in the lowest decile are earning 
less than the relevant minimum wage over the entire sample period, and in many cities this 
number is considerably higher.  The highest proportion is for Los Angeles, in which a full 39 
percent of Neumark’s data pool for the lowest decile are sub-minimum wage workers.8   
The Definition of Coverage with  Business-Assistance Clauses 
Another concern with Neumark’s methodology is his approach for defining coverage in 
cities where business-assistance recipients are covered by living wage laws.  As discussed above 
for Los Angeles, for all practical purposes Neumark is including the entire labor force as 
potentially covered by the law.  While Neumark acknowledges that this classification of business-
assistance coverage will be “noisy”, we would go further:  this classification is not consistent with 
the available evidence of how living wage laws have actually been implemented.  We draw this 
conclusion after conducting personal interviews with city officials in all the cities classified by 
Neumark himself as having business assistance clauses in their living wage ordinances.  Our goal 
was to determine the extent to which these cities were in fact applying the business-assistance 
clause in their living wage laws.  Based on our interviews with city staff, we found that, with the 
exception of San Antonio, none of the cities in Neumark’s study had actually implemented the 
business assistance provision in their living wage law during the period 1995 to 1999.9   
This has two important implications.  First, for all cities currently classified as business-
assistance cities, the category of “potentially covered” workers should include, at most, only 
workers in the likely-to-be-affected service industries (that is, 10-20% of the workforce in those 
cities rather than 90-95%).  Second, adjusting the “potentially covered” category to conform with 
the evidence runs counter to Neumark’s claim that it is the “broadness” of the business-
assistance-type living wage ordinances that explains the detectable increase in wages due to 
                                                 
8 It is also important to note that over the entire sample period approximately 10 percent of the lowest 
decile is comprised of workers earning exactly the minimum wage.  This implies that more than a third of 
the lowest decile is earning at or below the prevailing minimum wage.  
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living wage ordinances.10  Rather, the business-assistance-type living wage ordinances are not, in 
practice, broader than the contractor-only living wage ordinances.11  
The Geographic Distribution of Covered Workers 
Another methodological issue is the geographic distribution of covered workers in the 
lowest decile in both Neumark’s wage and employment analysis.  Panel A of Table 3 presents the 
number of affected workers in each living wage city for Models 1-3 with a 12 month lagged 
specification.  We focus only on the 12 month lagged specification for the sake of brevity.  The 
geographic distribution of covered workers in the 6 month lagged specification closely follows 
that presented in Table 3.   
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
A crucial fact that emerges from this table is that most of the covered workers are located 
in a very small number of cities.  Indeed for Models 2 and 3 of the wage analysis, approximately 
half of all affected workers are found in Los Angels alone.  Panel B of Table 3 presents similar 
estimates for Neumark’s employment analysis, and here too Los Angeles has a disproportionate 
share of the total number of affected workers, including 54% of all affected workers in Model 3.   
Neumark makes no mention of this geographic concentration of his data pool in his study.   
The concentration of affected workers in Los Angeles and a handful of other cities is due 
to three main factors.  The first is the differential size of the cities themselves, with Los Angeles 
having the largest population among the living wage cities in Neumark’s data pool.  The second 
is the nature of the ordinances in the different cities.  Using Neumark’s classifications, cities with 
business assistance clauses have a much larger pool of “potentially covered” workers than those 
with “contractors only” ordinances.  However the most important factor is the year in which 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Telephone interviews with Apney (10/30/01), Enman (10/30/01), Gibson (10/18/01), Greyson (10/15/01), 
Jacobson (10/29/01), and Robbins (10/23/01).  Full citations to interviews are in the reference section. 
10 Neumark concludes his analysis of the effects on wages of living wage laws by writing, “the effects are 
driven by cities in which the coverage of living wage laws is more broad—namely, cities that impose living 
wages on employees receiving business assistance from the city,” (Neumark 2002, pp. 73-4). 
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living wage laws were adopted in each city.  In the cases of Los Angeles and Minneapolis, both 
adopted their living wage laws in 1997.  This implies that in both cities workers are classified as 
affected for nearly a year more than in every other living wage city.  This also explains why cities 
such as Hartford, where their living wage ordinance was not passed until October 1999, have so 
few workers classified as affected in the 12 month lagged specification.  As we shall see in the 
next section, the geographic concentration of covered workers is central to explaining Neumark’s 
statistically significant results. 
Increasing wages and employment 
 As we have seen, Neumark finds that living wage laws produce a statistically significant 
negative employment effect on workers within the lowest decile—that is, there is a lower 
employment rate among low-wage workers after living wage laws are implemented than before.  
Of course, Neumark did also find an anomalous statistically significant positive employment 
effect for high-wage workers due to living wage laws.  But focusing on the result for low-wage 
workers only, Neumark interprets this negative employment effect as representing disemployment 
among low-wage workers, i.e. that low-wage workers are involuntarily facing diminished 
employment prospects.  But Neumark is neglecting here the well-known literature on labor force 
participation decisions resulting from wage increases, such as would occur through a living wage 
ordinance.  This issue is especially pertinent given that more than two-thirds of the workers in the 
lowest decile of Neumark’s data pool are women, whose labor force participation decisions are 
well known to be more complex than those for similarly-profiled men (see for example the 
discussions in Killingsworth and Heckman 1986, Eissa and Liebman 1996, and Eissa and Hoynes 
1998).  For example, as Eissa and Hoynes have demonstrated with respect to the earned income 
tax credit program, the increased earning opportunities afforded by the program do not 
necessarily increase women’s labor force participation and are likely to reduce participation in 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 For example, even in San Antonio, the only city to implement their business assistance clause in the 
period, fewer than 10 businesses were covered by the law during the 1996-00 period.   
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the case of married women.  For these women in the low-wage labor market, an increase in their 
take-home pay has enabled them to voluntarily cut back on their hours of work.  Their reduction 
in employment is not due to an involuntary loss of employment.  At least for some significant 
subset of low-wage workers, especially women, one might anticipate some analogous effects to 
operate in the case of living wage laws.  Neumark does not explore this possibility.   
4.  Re-Examining Neumark’s Analysis of Wage Effects  
In light of the above concerns, we now reexamine Neumark’s econometric results on the 
wage effects of living wage ordinances.   
Quantile Regression 
 In Table 4, we present results from testing Neumark’s models 1-3 using quantile 
regression centered on the 10th wage decile.  We report results only for the living wage variable 
lagged 12 months, that is, the variable on which Neumark himself concentrates his attention.  As 
we see, making this one methodological adjustment on Neumark’s model to control for sample 
selection bias produces substantially different results than Neumark obtained through his 
truncated regression technique, whose results we reported in our Table 1A.   
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
With Model 1, covering all living wage laws, we now find that the coefficient value on 
the living wage variable has fallen nearly 10-fold—from 6.95 in Neumark’s model to 0.74 and is 
not statistically significant.  With Model 2, in which the sample is divided according to 
Neumark’s categories of “potentially covered” and uncovered workers, we do still obtain a 
statistically significant coefficient for covered workers at the 10 percent level.  However, the 
coefficient on this variable has now fallen more than 3-fold, from 10.61 under Neumark’s 
specification to 3.04 with the quantile regression.  Finally, in our quantile regression of 
Neumark’s Model 3, the coefficient for “business assistance” living wage cities again falls nearly 
10-fold and is insignificant.  In short, we see that Neumark’s results are not robust after 
controlling for sample selection bias through quantile regression, but making no further 
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adjustments to his methodology.    At the very least, these results raise questions as to the overall 
robustness of Neumark’s findings, and, more generally, his methodology of relying exclusively 
on truncated OLS regressions.  Nevertheless, having raised these questions, we will now proceed 
through accepting as is his truncated OLS methodology, and addressing our other concerns with 
his methodology.    
Correcting the Coverage Classification in Business-Assistance Cities 
We now consider the issue of how Neumark chose to classify workers as among those 
“potentially covered” to receive mandated wage increases due to living wage ordinances.  As 
discussed earlier, no living wage city but San Antonio has actually implemented their business-
assistance clause between 1995 and 1999, the relevant years for the 12 month lagged 
specification.12  How would Neumark’s results be affected by classifying workers in business 
assistance cities in a manner reflective of the actual experiences in these cities?  To assess this, 
we re-estimated Neumark’s Model 2 and our Model 4 classifying workers in business assistance 
cities as “potentially covered” only if they worked in the service industry.13 Our revised wage 
equation results for the lowest decile are presented in Table 5.  We present results for both the 6 
and 12 month lagged specification. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
As is clear from the table, reclassifying potentially covered workers to more accurately 
reflect how living ordinances are being implemented substantially alters Neumark’s original 
findings.  Indeed, based on our revised classification, we find that there is no measurable wage 
effect of living wage ordinances on potentially covered workers for either the 6 or 12 month 
specification.  In fact, we observe a statistically significant, positive wage effect of living wages 
for uncovered workers in the 12 month lagged specification for Model 2, and in both the 6 and 12 
                                                 
12 It also merits note that in the San Antonio case they have applied their law to no more than a half dozen 
redevelopment projects since its passage in 1998 Jacobson interview (10/29/01). 
13 Since the service contract component of Minneapolis’ living wage law did not go into effect until 2001 
we did not classify any workers in that city as covered. 
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month specification for uncovered workers in business assistance cities in Model 4.  Thus, even if 
we ignore the bigger issues of data adequacy due to small sample sizes within local labor markets 
or the use of sub-minimum wage workers in our analysis, we still find that classifying workers as 
potentially covered or uncovered in a more plausible way itself eliminates Neumark’s statistically 
significant effects of living wage laws on potentially covered workers.  
  Sub-Minimum Wage Re-Specification 
We now examine the role that sub-minimum wage workers play within Neumark’s 
original wage analysis.  In an attempt to assess that role, we have re-estimated Neumark’s wage 
regressions reclassifying sub-minimum wage workers only as uncovered.  Table 6 presents wage 
equation Models 2 and 4 with the appropriately revised coverage classification. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]   
For Model 2, with both the 6 and 12 month lagged specifications, we see the magnitude 
of elasticity estimates for covered workers declines by more than a factor of 15 as compared with 
Neumark’s original elasticity estimates, and in both cases the new estimates are now statistically 
insignificant.  By contrast, under this revised coverage definition the elasticity estimates for 
uncovered workers in living wage cities in Model 2 are 3 times larger for the 6 month 
specification and 20 times larger for the 12 month lagged specification than Neumark’s original 
point estimate.  Both are now highly significant statistically.  And as we see in Model 4, the 
statistically significant results are concentrated in the cities with business assistance clauses in 
their living wage ordinances.   
It is also evident from the Model 4 results that the statistically significant results are 
being generated by the wage patterns of the sub-minimum wage workers.  As we see, uncovered 
workers in business assistance cities are the only ones who experience a statistically significant 
increase in their wages in Model 4 (for both the 6 and 12 month lagged specifications), and in 
both cases the elasticity estimates of .3 are three times larger than the largest elasticity estimate 
produced by Neumark in his original set of results.  It is crucial, therefore, to recognize that 
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almost all of the individuals who now fall into the category of uncovered workers in business 
assistance cities are sub-minimum wage workers.  It is, furthermore, increasingly clear that that 
the wage patterns for sub-minimum wage workers are highly influential in generating Neumark’s 
original findings.   
But let us consider this issue with still greater specificity.  As we have seen in Table 3 
and our earlier discussion, covered workers in Neumark’s wage analysis are highly concentrated 
geographically, with over half in Los Angeles alone in the business assistance models.  We 
therefore next pose the question:  to what degree can Neumark’s results be explained by the wage 
patterns of sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles alone?  Table 7 presents results that shed 
light on this question.    
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 In this table, we have conducted an analysis similar to that presented in Table 6, except 
we have reclassified the sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles alone as uncovered.  In the 
specification for Model 2 we see that uncovered workers have large and statistically significant 
wage effects in both the 6 and 12 month lagged specifications.  The implied elasticities of .17 and 
.15, respectively, are larger than those estimated for potentially covered workers in Neumark’s 
original specifications, and are highly significant.  For our Model 4, we find even larger elasticity 
estimates for uncovered workers in business assistance cities, .5 and .47 for the 6 and 12 month 
lagged specifications, respectively.   In short, Neumark’s results are not robust to the 
reclassification of sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles from his full national category 
into the category of uncovered workers.   
Wage Dynamics in Los Angeles 
 These results lead us to consider what actually is happening with sub-minimum wage 
workers in Los Angeles in our sample period given that, by definition, these workers are unlikely 
to be receiving mandated wage increases due to the passage of the city’s living wage law.  While 
a comprehensive treatment of the dynamics of the low-wage labor market in Los Angeles is 
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beyond the scope of this paper, two facts are of primary importance as potential sources of 
upward wage pressure.  First, along with the state of California as a whole, Los Angeles 
experienced dramatic declines in unemployment over the time period used in Neumark’s study.  
Figure 1 displays these unemployment rates for both California and the LA-Long Beach PMSA 
over the period 1995 to 2000.  As the figure shows, the monthly unemployment rate in Los 
Angeles declined from a high of 9.1 percent in July 1996 to a low of 4.7 percent in December 
2000.   Economic theory would suggest that, everything else equal, such a sharp decline in 
unemployment will give even low-wage workers increased bargaining power relative to 
employers, which in turn should drive up even low-end wages. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
A second factor is that California’s minimum wage increased from $4.25 to $5.75 over 
1996-1998, and the 12 month lagged value of the Los Angeles living wage rises in close 
correspondence with the largest minimum wage increase (in absolute terms), though, of course, 
the living wage rate far exceeds the new level for the statewide minimum wage.   We can observe 
this close relationship in Figure 2, which plots both the 12-month lagged living wage value and 
the contemporaneous minimum wage value for Los Angeles from January 1996 – October 2000.   
We also plot in Panel A of Figure 2 the mean wage of the lowest decile in Los Angeles.   What is 
clearly suggested by this figure is that a close correlation exists between changes in the mean 
wage and the minimum wage, but not between the mean wage and the living wage.   We also see 
from Panel B that at no point from January 1996 to October 2000 were any of the workers in the 
lowest decile in Los Angeles making a wage close to the living wage after it was passed. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
This descriptive evidence suggests that we consider more formally the effects of the 
California minimum wage increase and decline in the unemployment rate as factors exerting 
upward pressure on wages for sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles.  We present the 
results of this formal exercise in Table 8.  To begin with, in column one, we see that we do not 
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find a statistically significant positive effect for the living wage variable, lagged 12 months, as we 
had with tests run on the full Neumark sample of bottom decile workers.  As in Neumark’s initial 
specifications, this equation includes the minimum wage with a 12-month lag, which is also 
insignificant.  In column two we add the unemployment rate to our model specification, using a 
moving average of the current unemployment rate that includes observations three months before 
and three months after the current period.   This seven-month centered moving average is highly 
significant, and the magnitude of its effect is as large as that of the living wage variable, which 
unlike the column one results, is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in this specification.  
The 12-month lagged minimum wage remains insignificant in this specification as well.  
However, as seen in column three, when we specify the unemployment rate variable with a six-
month lag, the unemployment rate variable is still statistically significant at the 10 percent level, 
while the living wage variable becomes insignificant.  When we specify the unemployment rate 
variable with a 12-month lag, as reported in column four, none of the variables presented in Table 
8 are significant, and the living wage variable actually become negative, along with the 12-month 
lagged value of the minimum wage.   
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 The descriptive evidence in Figure 2 suggested that we also consider the minimum wage 
effects more carefully than we have done thus far, as we have up to this point relied on the 12-
month lagged value of the minimum wage as the only specification for this variable.  In all of 
Neumark’s models, the minimum wage is included with a lag period identical to the lag for the 
living wage variable.  However there are good reasons to believe that unlike living wage 
ordinances, minimum wage laws do not entail the same lag in implementation.  For one thing, the 
minimum wage is a long-standing labor market institution, and an increase does not require the 
long implementation process that has been the case with living wage ordinances.  Minimum wage 
increases also do not depend on city service contracting cycles, as do some living wage 
ordinances. Thus, minimum wage changes can be expected to take effect relatively quickly.   
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This all points towards the inclusion of the contemporaneous minimum wage as an 
alternative specification in our estimates, which we do in columns 5-7 of Table 8.  In column 5, 
as in column 2, we see that with the current unemployment rate variable included, the 
unemployment variable is significant and with the appropriate sign while the living wage and 
minimum wage variables are both insignificant.  In column 6 however, when the unemployment 
rate is lagged six months, the 12 month lagged living wage variable becomes insignificant and 
drops dramatically in magnitude.  Moreover, the contemporaneous minimum wage increases 
dramatically in magnitude, and becomes statistically significant at the five percent level.  When 
we include unemployment lagged 12 months, only the contemporaneous minimum wage is 
significant (at the five percent level) with an elasticity of 0.78.  These results are broadly similar 
for the living wage variable lagged 6 months. 
 Overall, these results are consistent with the descriptive evidence in showing the 
importance of the decline in the unemployment rate and the rise in the minimum wage in pulling 
up the wages of sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles. At the very least, we can conclude 
that the living wage is not robust as an explanatory variable on wages for this sample of workers, 
while the unemployment rate is highly robust in its explanatory power.  The contemporaneous 
minimum wage is also more consistently a significant factor than the living wage lagged 12 
months.  The broad conclusion, then, is that the rise in wages for LA’s sub-minimum wage 
workers is driven substantially by changes in the unemployment rate in the region and, somewhat 
less clearly, by the California minimum wage changes.  The wages of LA’s sub-minimum wage 
market are not being driven to a statistically significant extent, much less a substantively 
significant extent, by in the LA living wage.  This broad conclusion is important, in turn, for the 
overall interpretation of Neumark’s study, since, as we have seen, the effects of living wage 
ordinances throughout the United States are themselves  dependent  on including LA’s sub-
minimum wage workers in his sample.  
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5.  Re-Examining Neumark’s Employment Result 
We now turn to a brief examination of Neumark’s employment results in light of the 
concerns raised in Section 3 and the examination of his wage results in Section 4.  The first major 
issue we address is whether Neumark’s employment effects are in fact caused by workers likely 
to be covered by living wage laws.  As noted above, Neumark’s approach to estimating 
employment effects involves incorporating a large number of individuals who are not currently in 
the labor force, and therefore who do not possess identifying information on wages or sector of 
the economy in which they work.  Including these individuals outside the labor force in his 
employment analysis means that Neumark is unable to reproduce the “potentially covered” and 
“potentially uncovered” classifications that were the centerpiece of his wage analysis.  However, 
drawing upon Neumark, we develop here an approach which does allow us to retain this crucial 
covered/uncovered distinction.  This approach proceeds from the fact that the Current Population 
Survey incorporates information on sector of activity for all individuals who have been in the 
labor force at sometime in the past year, even if they were out of the labor force at the time they 
were surveyed.  By restricting our sample to only those individuals who currently are or have 
been in the labor force in the last year, we are then able to preserve the covered/uncovered 
distinction.   This restriction, moreover, is appropriate in substantive terms, since it is over the set 
of individuals with at least some marginal attachment to the labor market that we should expect to 
see any employment effects from living wage laws.   
In Table 9 we estimate three employment models, using the specifications from wage 
Models 1-3, with the restricted sample discussed above.  In the first panel, we see that for Model 
1, when the living wage variable is lagged 12 months it is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level, with a magnitude very close to the -5.62 estimate seen in Table 2A.  This suggests that 
while we are restricting our sample to those who have been at least marginally attached to the 
labor market within the year of the sample, we are still not making a significant empirical 
departure from Neumark’s original analysis. 
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[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
In the second panel, we find evidence still consistent with Neumark’s findings, namely a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient (at the 10 percent level) of -6.65 for the living 
wage variable for covered workers lagged 12 months.  Interestingly, when we separate cities into 
those with business assistance laws, versus those with contractor-only laws—i.e. Model 3, 
presented in panel 3 of Table 9—we find that the living wage does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the employment status of our sample.  It should be noted, however, that 
although neither the living wage variables for contractor-only nor business-assistance cities are 
statistically significant at conventional levels, the business assistance living wage variable is 
significant at a 15% threshold, and therefore could arguably be interpreted as supportive of 
Neumark’s model with the  reduced sample size.   
It is at this stage that our ability to separate out covered from uncovered workers becomes 
important.  Following our approach from the preceding section, in the bottom panel of Table 9 we 
adjust Neumark’s classification of workers as potentially covered and uncovered to reflect the 
actual application of living wage laws by cities that have business assistance provisions.  In other 
words, as with our approach with the wage models, we reclassify workers outside the service 
sector as uncovered, reflecting information on actual implementation of living wage laws 
provided to us by city officials.  As seen in the fourth panel, when this adjustment is made, there 
is no statistically significant effect for covered workers, and none for uncovered workers either at 
conventional levels.  Uncovered workers do display a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for the living wage lagged 12 months if we consider the significance threshold to be 
15% instead of 10%.   Overall, we again find that Neumark’s results are not robust to alternative 
specifications that are informed by the actual experiences with implementing living wage laws.   
6.  Concluding Remarks 
This critical appraisal of David Neumark’s 2002 study challenges his argument that 
living wage ordinances, particularly those covering business-assistance living wage ordinances, 
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increase wages for a far larger proportion of low-wage workers than has been previously 
estimated.  We also challenge Neumark’s finding that living wage ordinances cause 
disemployment.   
On methodological grounds we have demonstrated why the Current Population Survey is 
not an appropriate dataset for analyzing either the wage or employment effects of living wage 
laws.  We have also argued, on methodological grounds alone, that Neumark’s truncated OLS 
regressions are vulnerable to problems of sample selection bias.  The results we obtained through 
our quantile regression specification certainly, at the very least, raises concerns about the 
robustness of Neumark’s results using his truncated OLS methodology.  But even accepting 
Neumark’s truncated OLS methodology on its own terms, we demonstrate that his statistically 
significant results hinge on the way in which he treats workers earning below the minimum wage, 
as well as how he defines covered workers in business-assistance living wage cities.  We show 
that through classifying sub-minimum wage workers as uncovered, as opposed to Neumark’s 
category “potentially covered,” Neumark’s statistically significant wage results are invalidated 
for “potentially covered” workers.  Moreover, based on interviews with city staff in the cities in 
question, we have demonstrated that Neumark’s approach to defining “potentially covered” 
workers in cities with business assistance ordinances drastically overstates the number of workers 
likely to have received mandated wage increases through existing living wage laws.  We have 
also shown that once Neumark’s definition of “potentially covered” workers is corrected for this 
misclassification, we find no statistically significant effect of living wage ordinances on wages or 
employment for covered workers.  Finally, we have shown that Neumark’s original results rest on 
a sample weighted heavily toward just sub-minimum wage workers in Los Angeles.  When sub-
minimum wage workers in Los Angeles alone are reclassified as uncovered, Neumark’s putative 
“living wage effects” are again invalidated.     
The overall conclusion that we reach is clear:  David Neumark’s analysis of the effects of 
living wage laws in the United States has produced no results that stand up to the scrutiny of this 
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critical replication exercise.  Of course, our results do not speak to the broader substantive 
question as to how living wage laws have affected low-wage workers in terms of either their 
wages or their employment opportunities.  But we expect that many researchers will continue to 
make progress in addressing these substantive questions, which are, of course, the central matters 
of concern for understanding how living wage laws are affecting the lives of low-wage workers in 
the United States. 
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Centile range: <=10 10-25 25-50 50-75
Specification 1: -0.53 0.27 0.95 -0.03
Living Wage (2.23) (1.62) (1.65) (1.63)
Specification 2: 1.91 0.84 2.22 0.34
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.25) (1.70) (1.76) (1.79)
Specification 3: 6.95** 0.93 -0.01 -1.08
Living wage, 12-month lag (2.40) (1.78) (1.85) (1.92)
Unweighted Ns: 34,435 42,912 71,135 72,737
Uncovered Covered Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers Workers Workers
Centile range:
Specification 1: -4.99* 2.11 -1.02 1.23
Living Wage (2.97) (2.53) (1.82) (1.78)
Specification 2: -4.62 5.66** -1.09 1.98
Living wage, 6-month lag (3.07) (2.56) (1.92) (1.89)
Specification 3: 0.61 10.61** -1.28 2.26
Living wage, 12-month lag (3.49) (2.72) (2.07) (2.00)
Unweighted Ns:
Contractor Business Contractor Business
Only  Assistance Only  Assistance
Living Wage Living Wage Living Wage Living Wage
Centile range:
Specification 1: -4.50 1.78 -2.82 2.15
Living Wage (3.45) (2.76) (2.30) (2.09)
Specification 2: -5.22 5.83** -2.21 2.64
Living wage, 6-month lag (3.66) (2.66) (2.38) (2.21)
Specification 3: 0.50 10.54** -1.92 2.72
Living wage, 12-month lag (4.02) (2.78) (2.49) (2.31)
Unweighted Ns:
<=10 10-25
42,638
42,912
Table 1A: Effects of Living Wage Laws on Wages,
Alternative Classifications of Workers and Living Wage Laws
Replicating results from Neumark 2002
34,435
<=10 10-25
Model 1: All Living Wage Laws
Model 2: Potentially Covered and Uncovered Workers
Model 3: Contractor and Business Assistance Living Wage Laws
34,196
Notes:  These results are identical to those in Neumark (2002), Tables 5.3, 5.5, and 5.6. The 
dependent variable is log wages. Estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 100. Standard 
errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and non-independence within city-
month cells. A city's observations are included in the sample in a particular month and year if it has 
at least 25 observations for that particular month and year. See text for other controls included in 
the regression. * indicates statistical significance at the .10 level.  ** indicates statistical significance 
at the .05 level. 
Uncovered Covered Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers Workers Workers
Centile range:
Specification 2: -6.18* 0.21 -0.24 6.52**
Living wage, 6-month lag (3.67) (6.53) (5.91) (2.72)
Specification 3: -0.52 6.46 4.72 11.21**
Living wage, 12-month lag (4.11) (7.26) (6.05) (2.88)
Unweighted N: 34,196
Contractor Living Wage Laws Business Assistance Living Wage Laws
<=10
Table 1B: Effects of Living Wage Laws on Wages, 
Potentially Covered and Uncovered Workers Under Business Assistance and Contractor Living Wage Laws
An Extension of Models 2 and 3
Model 4
Notes:  See notes to Table 1A. * indicates statistical significance at the .10 level.  ** indicates statistical significance at the 
.05 level. 
Centile range: <=10 10-25 25-50 50-75
Specification 1: -1.77 0.02 2.58** 1.79*
Living Wage (2.14) (1.81) (1.18) (1.04)
Specification 2: -3.22 1.16 2.31* 1.32
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.26) (1.88) (1.24) (1.08)
Specification 3: -5.62** 1.62 1.55 2.44**
Living wage, 12-month lag (2.45) (2.02) (1.31) (1.16)
Unweighted Ns: 83,326 118,541 197,477 199,703
Contractor Business Contractor Business
Only  Assistance Only  Assistance
Living Wage Living Wage Living Wage Living Wage
Centile range:
Specification 1: -3.26 -0.81 0.59 -0.34
Living Wage (3.19) (2.73) (2.75) (2.26)
Specification 2: -5.49 -1.74 1.03 1.24
Living wage, 6-month lag (3.40) (2.90) (2.85) (2.36)
Specification 3: -5.26 -5.88* 1.45 1.74
Living wage, 12-month lag (3.79) (3.06) (3.06) (2.54)
Unweighted Ns:
Table 2A: Effects of Living Wage Laws on Employment,
Alternative Classifications of Living Wage Laws
Replicating results from Neumark 2002
83,326 118,541
<=10 10-25
Model 1: All Living Wage Laws
Model 3: Contractor and Business Assistance Living Wage Laws
Notes:  These results are identical to those in Neumark (2002), Tables 6.1 and 6.2. The 
dependent variable is employment status. Estimated coefficients have been multiplied by 100. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and non-
independence within city-month cells. A city's observations are included in the sample in a 
particular month and year if it has at least 25 observations for that particular month and year. 
See text for other controls included in the regression. * indicates statistical significance at the 
.10 level.  ** indicates statistical significance at the .05 level. 
Centile range: <=10 10-25 25-50 50-75
Specification 1: -1.06 -0.01 2.50** 1.75*
Living Wage (2.15) (1.84) (1.19) (1.05)
Specification 2: -2.51 0.97 2.35* 1.44
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.29) (1.91) (1.25) (1.09)
Specification 3: -4.80* 1.46 1.71 2.67**
Living wage, 12-month lag (2.48) (2.05) (1.32) (1.17)
Unweighted Ns: 78,779 112,555 187,605 189,442
Contractor Business Contractor Business
Only  Assistance Only  Assistance
Living Wage Living Wage Living Wage Living Wage
Centile range:
Specification 1: -2.58 -0.12 0.56 -0.37
Living Wage (3.23) (2.74) (2.83) (2.27)
Specification 2: -4.64 -1.19 0.69 1.14
Living wage, 6-month lag (3.47) (2.90) (2.94) (2.38)
Specification 3: -3.99 -5.34* 1.34 1.55
Living wage, 12-month lag (3.91) (3.07) (3.17) (2.56)
Unweighted Ns: 78,779 112,555
Table 2B: Effects of Living Wage Laws on Employment,
Alternative Classifications of Living Wage Laws
Sample Restricted to Cities in Wage Analysis
<=10 10-25
Model 1: All Living Wage Laws
Model 3: Contractor and Business Assistance Living Wage Laws
Notes:  The dependent variable is employment status. Estimated coefficients have been 
multiplied by 100. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and non-independence within city-month cells. A city's observations are included in the 
sample if it appeared in the wage analysis sample. See text for other controls included in the 
regression. * indicates statistical significance at the .10 level.  ** indicates statistical 
significance at the .05 level. 
Panel A: Wage Analysis
City Unwtd. N Wtd. % Unwtd. N Wtd. % Unwtd. N Wtd. %
Los Angeles 1,196 27.5 1,136 49.1 1,196 52.4
Minneapolis 369 10.4 344 18.2 369 19.8
Detroit 230 5.0 215 8.7 230 9.5
Oakland 106 4.2 94 7.0 106 7.9
San Antonio 79 2.6 73 4.5 79 4.9
San Jose 69 2.6 58 4.2 69 5.0
Hartford 9 0.3 7 0.4 9 0.5
Chicago 476 10.4 44 1.9 -- --
Baltimore 325 12.6 23 1.7 -- --
Milwaukee 250 8.0 25 1.6 -- --
Durham 96 2.3 31 1.4 -- --
Boston 157 3.5 20 0.8 -- --
Portland 360 8.4 13 0.6 -- --
Dayton 95 2.1 1 0.0 -- --
Jersey City 15 0.3 1 0.0 -- --
Total 3,832 100 2,085 100 2,058 100
Panel B: Employment Analysis
City Unwtd. N Wtd. % Unwtd. N Wtd. %
Los Angeles 2,348 26.3 2,348 53.4
Minneapolis 592 8.2 592 16.6
Detroit 472 5.1 472 10.4
Oakland 218 4.2 218 8.5
San Antonio 147 2.4 147 4.8
San Jose 119 2.3 119 4.7
Hartford 21 0.3 21 0.5
Madison 20 0.3 20 0.6
Tucson 17 0.2 17 0.4
Duluth 3 0.0 3 0.1
Baltimore 645 12.2 -- --
Boston 400 4.3 -- --
Chicago 1,109 12.2 -- --
Dayton 168 1.8 -- --
Jersey City 203 2.2 -- --
Milwaukee 434 6.7 -- --
New Haven 109 1.4 -- --
Portland 617 7.4 -- --
Durham 216 2.6 -- --
Total 7,858 100 3,957 100
All Living Wage Laws Business Assistance Cities
Notes: In Model 1, affected workers are those workers who live in a city with a living wage ordinance in effect (lagged 12 
months). In Model 2, affected workers are those workers who live in a city with a living wage ordinance in effect (lagged 12 
months) and are classified as "potentially covered" according to their industry affiliation. In Model 3, affected workers are those 
workers who live in a city with a business-assistance type living wage ordinance in effect (lagged 12 months).
All Living Wage Laws Covered Workers Business Assistance Cities
Model 1 Model 3
Table. 3: Composition of Affected Workers in the Lowest Decile
12-Month Lagged Living Wage Specifications
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Table 4: Estimating the Effects of Living Wage Laws on Wages
Replicating Neumark's Models 1-3 Utilizing Quantile Regression
Model 1: All Living Wage Laws
Quantile Specified: 10th
Living wage, 12-month lag 0.74
(1.35)
N 291,743
Model 2: All Living Wage Laws
Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers
Quantile Specified: 10th
Living wage, 12-month lag 0.48 3.04*
(2.43) (1.60)
N 291,743
Model 3: Contractor and Business Assistance Living Wage
Contractor Business
Only Assistance
Living Wage Living Wage
Quantile Specified: 10th
Living wage, 12-month lag -0.15 1.09
(2.70) (1.21)
N 291,743
Notes:  These results are estimated using quantile regression for the 
10th centile of the wage distribution.  Standard errors are bootstrapped 
to address heteroskedasticity.  * indicates statistical significance at the 
.10 level.  ** indicates statistical significance at the .05 level. 
Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers  
Centile range:
Specification 2: 0.21 -4.21
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.49) (4.16)
Specification 3: 5.69** 0.36
Living wage, 12-month lag (2.68) (4.91)
Unweighted N:
Uncovered Covered Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers Workers Workers
Centile range:
Specification 2: -6.54* -0.60 6.23** -6.48
Living wage, 6-month lag (3.67) (6.52) (3.18) (5.07)
Specification 3: -1.00 5.75 12.11** -2.70
Living wage, 12-month lag (4.11) (7.23) (3.19) (6.15)
Unweighted N:
<=10
34,196
34,196
Model 4: Potentially Covered and Uncovered Workers Under Business Assistance and Contractor Living Wage Laws
Contractor Living Wage Laws Business Assistance Living Wage Laws
Table 5: Effects of Living Wage Laws on Wages, 
Alternative  Coverage Classification
Model 2: Potentially Covered and Uncovered Workers
<=10
Notes: See notes to Table 1A.  Coverage definition is based on the actual implementation of living wage ordinances (see text for 
full description). * indicates statistical significance at the .10 level.  ** indicates statistical significance at the .05 level.
Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers  
Centile range:
Specification 2: 12.91** 0.21
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.75) (2.21)
Specification 3: 11.85** 0.86
Living wage, 12-month lag (3.07) (2.40)
Unweighted N:
Uncovered Covered Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers Workers Workers
Centile range:
Specification 2: -0.56 5.74 30.27** 1.89
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.46) (3.88) (4.83) (2.30)
Specification 3: -0.57 6.71 30.22** 2.07
Living wage, 12-month lag (2.65) (4.38) (5.58) (2.51)
Unweighted N:
<=10
34,196
34,196
Model 4: Potentially Covered and Uncovered Workers Under Business Assistance and Contractor Living Wage Laws
Contractor Living Wage Laws Business Assistance Living Wage Laws
Table 6: Effects of Living Wage Laws on Wages, 
Subminimum Wage Workers Classified as Uncovered
Model 2: Potentially Covered and Uncovered Workers
<=10
Notes: See notes to Table 1A. Subminimum wage workers who were previously classified as covered are classified as 
uncovered here, along with workers classified as uncovered based on the industry affiliation. * indicates statistical significance at 
the .10 level.  ** indicates statistical significance at the .05 level.
Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers  
Centile range:
Specification 2: 16.54** -0.43
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.99) (2.15)
Specification 3: 15.03** -0.22
Living wage, 12-month lag (3.23) (2.38)
Unweighted N:
Uncovered Covered Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers Workers Workers
Centile range:
Specification 2: -0.13 -0.14 49.76** 2.43
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.43) (4.71) (5.36) (2.19)
Specification 3: -0.37 2.36 46.88** 1.76
Living wage, 12-month lag (2.64) (5.28) (5.34) (2.46)
Unweighted N:
<=10
34,196
34,196
Model 4: Potentially Covered and Uncovered Workers Under Business Assistance and Contractor Living Wage Laws
Contractor Living Wage Laws Business Assistance Living Wage Laws
Table 7: Effects of Living Wage Laws on Wages, 
Los Angeles Subminimum Wage Workers Classified as Uncovered
Model 2: Potentially Covered and Uncovered Workers
<=10
Notes: See notes to Table 1A. Los Angeles subminimum wage workers who were previously classified as covered are classified 
as uncovered here, along with workers classified as uncovered based on the industry affiliation. * indicates statistical 
significance at the .10 level.  ** indicates statistical significance at the .05 level.
Figure 1 - Unemployment Rate in California and Los Angeles: 1995-2000
(Not Seasonally Adjusted)
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Figure 2. Los Angeles Wage Trends, 1996-2000
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Table 8: Explaining Wages for Subminimum Wage Workers in Los Angeles
Model 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Centile range: <=10 <=10 <=10  <=10 <=10 <=10 <=10
Unemployment Rate - -22.01** - - -20.69** - -
(7 month moving average, centered) (7.45) (7.02)
Unemployment Rate, lagged 6 months - - -10.06** - - -10.26** -
(7 month moving average, centered) (3.64) (3.35)
Unemployment Rate, lagged 12 months - - - -3.23 - - -5.84
(7 month moving average, centered) (5.95) (5.83)
Minimum Wage, current - - - - 12.49 69.82* 76.16**
(35.15) (37.21) (36.17)
Minimum Wage, lagged 12 months -14.9 -43.49 -53.91 -19.33 -39.66 -42.84 -10.02
(38.65) (36.52) (39.17) (38.33) (38.69) (38.83) (36.40)
Living Wage, lagged 12 months 1.03 23.71** 4.35 -2.48 20.53* -5.73 -16.38
(8.09) (10.44) (7.12) (11.08) (11.74) (9.14) (12.69)
Unweighted N: 845 845 845 845 845 845 845
Notes: See notes to Table 1A.  
* indicates statistical significance at the .10 level.  ** indicates statistical significance at the .05 level.
Alternative Samples and Classifications
Centile range: <=10
Specification 1: -0.65
Living wage (2.50)
Specification 2: -1.58
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.55)
Specification 3: -5.38**
Living wage, 12-month lag (2.74)
Unweighted N: 47,759
Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers  
Centile range:
Specification 1: -1.06 -1.35
Living wage (3.28) (2.96)
Specification 2: -2.26 -3.16
Living wage, 6-month lag (3.40) (3.21)
Specification 3: -5.70 -6.65*
Living wage, 12-month lag (3.83) (3.55)
Unweighted N:
Contractor Business
Only Assistance  
Centile range:
Specification 1: -2.42 0.49
Living wage (3.58) (3.26)
Specification 2: -2.93 -0.70
Living wage, 6-month lag (3.65) (3.35)
Specification 3: -4.85 -5.74
Living wage, 12-month lag (3.97) (3.59)
Unweighted N:
or NILF and worked in last year]
Uncovered Covered
Workers Workers  
Centile range:
Specification 1: -0.47 -1.45
Living wage (2.62) (4.71)
Specification 2: -2.00 -2.04
Living wage, 6-month lag (2.77) (5.27)
Specification 3: -4.69 -6.55
Living wage, 12-month lag (3.04) (6.12)
Unweighted N:
47,759
Model 2 - Corrected Classification, New Sample [only those in the labor force or
<=10
46,133
<=10
46,133
Model 3, New Sample [only those in the labor force or NILF and worked last year]
<=10
Table 9: Effects of Living Wage Laws on Employment,
Model 1, New Sample [only those in the labor force or NILF and worked last year]
Model 2: Potentially Covered and Uncovered Workers, Neumark's Classification - 
New Sample [only those in the labor force or NILF and worked last year]
Notes:  The dependent variable is employment status. Estimated coefficients have been 
multiplied by 100. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and non-independence within city-month cells. A city's observations are included in the 
sample if it appeared in the wage analysis sample. See text for other controls included in the 
regression. * indicates statistical significance at the .10 level.  ** indicates statistical 
significance at the .05 level. 
